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PCAOB Inspections:  
 Perceptions of Triennial Firms with No-Deficiency Inspections 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The drive to enhance audit quality after the cascade of audit failures in the final decades 
of the last century and first two years of the new century resulted in a new structure for 
the oversight of public accounting firms.   The Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) was established with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
This Board was given the authority to inspect all public accounting firms who provide 
audits to publicly-owned companies reporting to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Such public accounting firms were required to register with the PCAOB.  
Accounting firms who audit more than 100 clients per year are required to undergo a 
yearly inspection; firms who audit 100 or fewer clients undergo inspections at least once 
every three years and are referred to as triennial firms.  
 
No firms that are inspected yearly have to date received a deficiency free inspection 
report.  However, some of the triennial firms have had deficiency free reports.  It is this 
sub population of registered companies -- the triennial firms --  that is the topic of this 
paper.  Furthermore, the interest here is limited to inspection of the auditing process of 
the firm; there is no attention to quality control, which constitutes a separate assessment 
and conclusion.     
 
 A simple, relatively brief survey inquiry questionnaire was designed to obtain the 
opinions of a key person in the sample of firms chosen at random.  Questions asked for   
reasons for their deficiency-free inspections, opinions related to the value of inspections, 
the role of the PCAOB, and their interest in increasing the number of SEC reporting 
clients they serve.  The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter.   
 
Executives of  41 (35.6 percent) of the 115 to whom requests were mailed responded.   
Among the findings were:  A.  Factors perceived critical for achieving no-deficiency 
audits accepted by the respondents were:  1.  Systematic, timely and thorough review 
process; 2.  Level of knowledge/skill of the total audit team and; 3.  audit partner’s skill 
in team leadership.   B.   A majority of respondents concurred the reasons for deficiencies 
were 1.  inadequate review process, 2.  weaknesses in knowledge of relevant GAAP and 
3.  audit partner leadership skills inadequate.  Other conclusions are included in the 
report. 
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PCAOB Inspections:  
 Perceptions of Triennial Firms with No-Deficiency Inspections 
 
  
The drive to enhance audit quality after the cascade of audit failures in the final decades 
of the last century and first two years of the new century resulted in a new structure for 
the oversight of public accounting firms.  Among the changes were:    accounting firms. 
providing audits to clients reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
(1) were required to register with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) and (2) had to undergo inspections of their auditing function and their quality 
control programs.  These requirements are stated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
which established the PCAOB.  That Act stated the general nature of the Board’s 
responsibilities for inspections of registered public accounting firms: 
 
The Board shall conduct a continuing program of inspections to assess the degree 
of compliance of each registered public accounting firm and associated persons. . 
. with this Act, the rules of the board, the rules of the Commission, or professional 
standards, in connection with its performance of audits, issuance of audit reports, 
and related matters involving issuers.  (Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 104) 
 
The Act also set the frequency of inspections stating that  
 
(A) annually with respect to each registered public accounting  firm that regularly 
provides audit reports for more than 100 issuers, and (B) not less frequently than 
once every 3 years with respect to each registered public accounting firm that 
regularly provides audit reports for 100 or fewer issuers.  (Sarbanes-Oxley, Ibid.)  
 
Inspection reports relate to both auditing and quality control programs.  Deficiencies 
found related to auditing are identified in the publicly-disclosed inspection reports posted 
at the PCAOB website.  If no deficiencies are discovered in the inspection of audits 
performed, the report includes this information.  
 
Weaknesses in quality control are not noted initially in the publicly-disclosed inspection 
reports.  However, if there are no problems related to quality controls the publicly-
disclosed report will include a note about this matter.   
 
Most inspected registered firms have received inspection reports with deficiencies noted.  
(Deficiencies are referred to as Issuer A, issuer, B, etc; names of audit clients are not 
identified in the publicly disclosed reports at the PCAOB Website.)  None of the ten 
firms that audit over 100 clients has received to date (as of late March 2008) a no-
deficiency report.  However, there are some firms among those that audit 100 or fewer 
companies reporting to the SEC that have had deficiency-free reports.       
 
Olson, the Chairman of the PCAOB in testimony before the Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives noted the importance of small registered firms  
by stating: 
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. . . of the 1,000 plus domestic audit firms that are registered with the PCAOB, the 
overwhelming number are small firms.  . . . While our experience in inspecting 
these firms [the triennial firms] varies, we are reassured to discover that many 
very small firms provide high quality audits for their clients, many of whom are 
small businesses.  (Olson,, 2007) 
 
It is this sub population of registered companies -- the triennial firms --  that have 
deficiency-free reports that is the topic of this paper.  Furthermore, the interest here is 
limited to inspection of the auditing process of the firm; there is no attention to quality 
control, which constitutes a separate assessment and conclusion.    It is true that there is 
in reality an overlap between the two components of inspections.  Indeed, many quality 
control problems identified have been related to the auditing process and audit 
conclusions of the firms.  The overlap and interrelations are worthy of study but are 
beyond the scope of this exploratory survey investigation.   
 
 A simple, relatively brief survey inquiry questionnaire was designed to obtain the 
opinions of a key person in the sample of firms chosen at random.  Questions range from 
perceptions of the reasons for their deficiency-free inspections, opinions related to the 
value of inspections, the PCAOB to their interest in increasing the number of SEC 
reporting clients they serve.  The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter.   
 
In the remaining parts of this paper, the following topics are discussed:   1.  The 
Inspection Process;  2.  Extent of  Inspections Completed; 3. Criticism of the Inspection 
Process; 4.  Methodology and Limitations of the Survey;  5.  Responses from Triennial 
Firms; 6.  Review of  Literature; and  7.  Summary and Reflections on Responses.  
 
                                          1.  The Inspection Process 
 
From the initial functioning of the PCAOB, the Board determined that a supervisory 
approach would be the strategy for determining compliance with rules and audit 
guidance. Inspections began in 2003 with limited inspections of the largest 4 U. S. public 
accounting firms.  Then in 2004 inspections began for registered accounting firms of all 
sizes.  At the conclusion of each inspection, a report is prepared that is submitted to the 
SEC and to the inspected accounting firm.  Additionally, there is a publicly disclosed 
inspection report that is posted at the PCAOB Website. 
 
The Nature of an Inspection 
 
The inspection process has been designed to encourage public accounting firms to 
maintain a high quality auditing process through an inspection of both auditing policies 
and practices and quality control programs.  The goal is to enhance the quality of audits 
through identifying and addressing weaknesses and deficiencies related to how the firm 
under inspection conducts audits.    
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The overriding question for the inspectors is:  Has this firm adhered to the rules and 
practices of auditing in the performance of audits of publicly-owned companies?    
 
Failures that are identified as deficiencies are described by the PCAOB as “only those 
deficiencies that, in the inspection team’s judgment, resulted in the firm failing to obtain 
sufficient competent evidence to support its opinion on the financial statements.”  
(PCAOB,  Report on the PCAOB’s 2004. . . . ) 
 
There is no established strategy that is used for all inspections.  The inspectors for a 
particular inspection determine which audits are selected, and what aspects of those 
selected will be reviewed.   Through the review of such aspects, the inspectors “may 
identify ways in which a particular audit is deficient, including failures by the firm to 
identify, or to address appropriately whether the financial statements are fairly present the 
financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of the issuer in conformity with 
GAAP.”  (Each inspection report includes this statement or a similar one.)  
 
Inspectors review audit documentation for those audits selected and also interact with 
staff in discussions about what is being inspected.  Changes in what is to be done, in 
some instance, are made as the inspection proceeds. 
 
Each inspection report states:   
 
It is not the purpose of an inspection, however, to review all of a firm’s audits or 
to identify every respect in which a reviewed audit is deficient.  Accordingly, a 
Board inspection report should not be understood to provide any assurance that 
the firm’s audits, or its issuer clients’ financial statements, are free of any 
deficiencies not specifically described in an inspection report.  (See an Inspection 
Report at the PCAOB Website for this paragraph or a similar one.) 
 
Limitations in Conclusions Drawn from an Inspection Report 
 
Conclusions from an inspection report are limited.  There is no basis for a judgment about 
audit quality in the particular registered firm under inspection.  Furthermore, there is no 
basis for determining of audit quality of all the inspected firms or a subgroup of inspected 
firms.  The unique, or custom, design of each inspection precludes any overall 
generalizations about audit quality.  Each inspection report states that there is no basis for 
supporting any negative inference in this standard paragraph that is found in each 
inspection report: 
 
The express inclusion of certain deficiencies and potential deficiencies, however, 
should not be construed to support any negative inference that any other aspect of 
the firm’s systems, policies, procedures, practices, or conduct is approved or 
condoned by the Board or judged by the Board to comply with laws, rules, and 
professional standards.  (See an inspection report for this statement) 
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Each inspection report informs the reader that “any references . . . to violations or 
potential violations of laws, rules, or professional standards should be understood in the 
supervisory context in which this report was prepared.”  
 
Therefore, the question can be raised:  “Why be concerned about triennial firms that have 
no-deficiency inspection reports if there is no basis for judging the firm?”   “Is it not 
appropriate to conclude simply that those who have no deficiencies have “done 
something right,” if only partially?   
 
Also, since the Board has chosen a supervisory approach, there is a possibility that 
receiving a report that indicates that the firm’s inspection revealed no deficiencies is an 
incentive to maintain high standards for audit engagements.  If deficiencies are disclosed, 
will such information motivate firms to reduce the incidence of deficiencies in the future?    
 
At this point, the preceding paragraph is merely identifying potential hypotheses for 
future investigation.   This exploratory survey of firms with deficiency-free inspection 
reports provides merely some opinions and reflections on the experience of heads of 
triennial firms about the topics included in the survey.    
 
Information Provided about the Firm and the Process 
 
Information in the publicly-disclosed inspection reports is not identical from one 
inspection report to another.  In general, the reader does find some information about the 
firm and some about the process. 
 
Information about Each Firm 
 
Inspection reports identify the number and location of offices, the nature of ownership 
structure, number of partners, number of professional staff and number of issuer audit 
clients.  However, the latter number – number of issuer audit clients --  is noted to be the 
number provided by the registered firm under inspection.  The inspectors do nothing to 
verify the figure provided. 
 
Some information is not provided including who is responsible for the management and 
oversight of the auditing function and the quality control function.  If there has been a 
merger or split in the firm, there is no reference to such change.  There is no 
identification of the persons with whom the inspectors interacted. However, the 
respondent was asked to identify his/her position.   There is no information about how 
any challenges to deficiencies are reviewed and what resolution, if any, is reached. 
 
Information about the Process 
 
Information is provided about the period during which the inspection took place; 
however, it is not sufficiently detailed so the reader does not learn the number of 
inspectors involved or how many hours were spent in field work.  Additionally, there is a 
general reference to the offices of the registered firm that were included in the inspection. 
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In most reports, there is reference to the number of audits involved in the inspection, but 
there is no explanation why, for example, 2 audits of the 5 were inspected in one instance 
while in another instance all of the 4 audits of SEC reporting clients were inspected.   
 
For firms with deficiencies, there is provided a general discussion of the deficiencies 
found.    An example of the explanation for a firm where the audits of all 3 issuers were 
included in the inspection report that included deficiencies is the following:   
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of 
the performance of all three of the Firm’s audits of the financial statements of 
issuers.  Those aspects were selected according to the Board’s criteria, and the 
Firm was not allowed an opportunity to limit or influence the selection process. 
 
The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit deficiencies.  
The deficiencies identified in two of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of 
such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not 
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s 
financial statements.  Those deficiencies included the failure to perform and 
document adequate procedures related to the existence of plan investment in two 
of the audits reviewed.  (See Inspection of Dannible & McKee LLP, May 11, 
2006 at PCAOB Website)   
 
As noted earlier, if there are no deficiencies related to auditing, the inspection report will 
include a paragraph that so states.  The statement below is from the second inspection of 
the same Firm (where there were no deficiencies) noted in the preceding excerpt from the 
Firm’s first inspection report.  While the firm continued to report that it had 3 issuers, in 
the second inspection, only one issuer’s audit was inspected.  The statement quoted  
about no deficiencies is typical of  the statement found in most such inspection reports:   
 
The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm’s auditing of 
financial statements of one issuer.  The scope of this review was determined 
according to the Board’s criteria, and the Firm was not allowed an opportunity to 
limit or influence the scope.  This review did not identify any audit performance 
issues that, in the inspection team’s view, resulted in the Firm failing to obtain 
sufficient competent evidential matter to support this opinion on the issuer’s 
financial statements.  (See Inspection of Dannible & McKee, LLP, October 23, 
2008 at PCAOB Website) 
 
 
2.  The Extent of Inspections Completed 
 
The PCAOB issued a report on the PCAOB’s 2004, 2005, and 2006 inspections of 
domestic triennially inspected reports.  The Report included some details about the extent 
of inspections through 2006 of accounting firms that audit no more than 100 issuers each 
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year.  These firms are referred to as “the triennial firms” since they are subject to 
inspections at least once in every three calendar years.  The report stated that 
 
91 inspections were performed during the 2004 inspection cycle, 257 inspections    
during its 2005 inspection cycle, and 149 inspections in 2006 cycle, for a total of .   
            497 inspections.  (However, as of  October 2007, there were 439 reports issued;                                                                
            58 were yet to be issued.).  Of the 439 reports on the first inspections of U. S.  
            triennial firms issued to date (through 2006), 124 (approximately 28 percent) did  
            not identify any audit performance deficiencies. . . .  (PCAOB, Report on the    
            PCAOB’s ) 
 
A footnote in the above noted PCAOB Report indicated the extent of domestic registered 
firms were inspected:  Approximately 4 percent had from 51 through 100 issuers; six 
percent had from 26 through 50 issuers; twenty-seven percent had from 6 through 25 
issuers and 62 percent had five or few issuer audit clients.  (Ibid. )   
 
The last available Annual Report of PCAOB is for 2007 (as of April 10, 2009).  This 
Report noted that for the year 2007,  PCAOB inspectors reviewed 461 audit engagements 
performed by the 10 firms that had audited more than 100 issuers in 2007 and 574 audits 
performed by the 226 other firms inspected.  (Inspection reports of the 10 firms reveal no 
information about the number of audits inspected in each audit.)  However, the figures 
provided in the 2007 Annual Report provide a basis for calculating averages:  For those 
auditing more than 100 clients, the average is 46 audits per firm; for the triennial firms, 
the average was 2.5.    
 
The average for triennial firms is reasonable given that in the first three years’ 
inspections, 62 percent of the inspections were of firms with five or fewer issuers.  
Actually, there were a few inspection reports that noted “none” for number of issuers that 
were explained as firms that had ceased to be a client’s auditor so a prior audit of the 
client was reviewed to determine effectiveness of the firm’s auditing policies and 
procedures.    
 
Role of the PCAOB’s Office and Research and Analysis 
 
As noted in the Annual Report for 2007, the Office of Research and Analysis (ORA) 
assists “in selecting audit engagements and identifying the risk areas within each 
engagement that might be reviewed.”    Additionally, the ORA provides research notes 
and training on complex accounting issues and trends in the market.  For the year 2007, 
training was related to “fair value accounting, accounting treatment of subprime 
mortgage securities and resulting audit issues.”  
 
The Inspection Staff  
 
Experienced auditors are hired to serve as inspectors.  In 2007, the inspection team 
leaders responsible for large firm inspections had had 23 years of relevant experience.  
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The average for inspection team members averaged 15 years of relevant experience.  
These inspectors are located in the several branch offices of the PCAOB. 
 
Budget Allocated for Inspections 
 
It is not surprising that an oversight agency allocates considerable resources to 
inspections.  The actual expenditures for inspections in 2007 were $54.944 M (43.74 
percent of total budget); in 2008 budgeted expenditures were $64,573 M (44.65 percent 
of total budget) and for 2009 the budgeted expenditures are 68,753 M (43.62 percent of 
total budget)    The extent of increase between actual expenditures for 2007 and budgeted 
expenditures for 2009 is essentially the same.  (Increase in total budget is 25.4 percent, 
while the increase in expenditures for inspections is 25.13 percent)  (PCAOB Budgets for 
2007 and 2009) 
 
Where Inspections are Performed 
 
Initially all inspections were on site.  However, more recently some inspections are 
performed in PCAOB offices throughout the United States.  In 2007 the PCAOB 
performed 44 percent of its inspections of the 179 U. S. firms from PCAOB offices, 
which are located in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, New York, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles and Washington, DC.    
 
The Annual Report for 2007 noted that “while not appropriate in every case, where they 
make sense, these PCAOB office-based inspections save time and money for both the 
PCAOB and the firm.  (See comment on office inspections on page 19, Related to 
Statement 3)       
3.  Criticism of the PCAOB Inspection Process 
 
Although inspections have been underway since 2003 (with the initial inspections of the 
big four firms only limited in scope), there has not been disclosed any serious assessment 
of the effectiveness of the process.   An interesting paper suggesting needed changes is 
one by Glover, Prawitt and Taylor.  The abstract includes the following:   
 
Although we acknowledge the benefits brought about by SOX, some of the 
problems that we outline are attributable to PCAOB choices that are not vetted 
publicly.  In our view the Board’s ability to achieve its mission is severely limited 
by its early choices, together with its incentives, organizational composition and 
structure.   We believe fundamental changes are needed in the areas of inspections 
and standard setting.  ( Glover, et.al.) 
 
Concern about the sufficiency of the process was discussed by an experienced 
auditor, McDonnell, who noted: 
 
The PCAOB made it clear the profession must regain the public’s 
confidence or face severe censure. But the board’s decision to use an 
inspection process to perform its oversight creates a high-risk environment 
  
                                                                                                                                           10 
                                                                                                                                           
 
for the profession. In a February 2004 speech at the Economic Club of 
Chicago, McDonough said the PCAOB inspection process would consist 
of reviews of audit engagements to ensure compliance with securities 
laws, the rules of the SEC and the PCAOB and the highest professional 
standards. 
 
Unfortunately, experience shows this approach provided little assurance 
of mitigating the risk of audit failure. Even though such reviews were an 
integral part of the internal quality control programs of audit firms for 
years, they weren’t very effective in preventing audit failures. Why would 
the PCAOB’s experience be any different? When I visited the PCAOB 
several months ago and posed that question to George H. Diacont, the 
PCAOB’s director of registration and inspections, he answered, “We’ll do it 
better.” (McDonnell) 
 
A similar concern about the adequacy of the overall process was noted by Alles 
et.al. who noted: 
 
Given its ambitious agenda to extend inspections beyond the Big 4, the 
PCAOB should reflect on its experiences during both the 2004 and 2005 
inspection programs and evaluate its procedures. For example, are the 
inspections structured so they will help restore the credibility of the audit 
function? More importantly, will the PCAOB’s inspection process uncover 
the underlying auditing and reporting problems that led to the creation of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Probably not. (Alles, et al.) 
 
Ciesielski noted the extent of inspections implied in SEC Chairman Cox’s 
testimony in mid September (2006) by quoting Cox commenting about the SEC’s 
concern about audits being done without wasted time and effort: 
 
We anticipate that the SEC staff’s next inspection of the PCAOB will focus 
on the PCAOB’s own inspection program for registered audit firms. In 
particular, the staff will likely focus on the PCAOB’s inspection of audits 
under PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2. . . .we hope to achieve greater 
compliance with the Commission’s and the PCAOB’s own guidance that 
these be risk-based and cost-effective. (Cox’s words as quoted in 
Ciesielski, The AAO Weblog) 
 
Gullapalli, in a Wall Street Journal article reported, after talking with companies 
who had the results of their limited inspections, that: 
 
In general, the companies [interviewed for the article] dub the change 
superficial and say it didn’t have anything to do with their fundamentals. . .. 
Still however small the dollars in these particular instances may be, some 
accounting specialists see the accounting board’s close look at this 
relatively obscure rule [reference to requirement in Emerging Issues Task 
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Force Issue No. 95-22: “Balance Sheet Classification of Borrowings 
Outstanding under Revolving Credit Arrangements.”] as a possible 
preview of more stringent rule enforcement in general. (Gullapalli) 
 
Johnson noted that the “second round of official inspection reports related to the 
Big Four audit firms” led to a “handful of negative headlines” which may reflect 
the inadequacy of the shared information as well as the fact that the reports are 
for past periods and do not truly reflect how the audit firms are currently 
performing. As Johnson stated: 
 
Using the terms “failed” and “failure” numerous times, the PCAOB cited 
the firms for basic accounting issues, some of which relate to lease and 
tax accounting, revenue recognition, and goodwill-impairment testing. All 
four of the reports, and the PCAOB’s previous evaluations of the Big 
Four’s work, noted that in some instances the firms did not “identify or 
appropriately address errors in the issuer’s application of GAAP.” 
(Johnson,  Why the Big Four . .  . ) 
 
Leone noted that the 2005 inspections of two of the big four that were issued in 
early January 2007. She commented: 
 
. . . one report identifies 10 companies for which audits were deficient, 
and says that in ‘some cases’ the errors appeared ‘likely to be material to 
the issuer’s financial statements.’ The other report identifies 11 deficient 
audits, and says that in ‘one case’ the result is likely to be material. 
(Leone) 
 
Leone noted that neither auditor changed any of its audit opinions as a result of 
the PCAOB report or the completion of further procedures. 
 
In responses to questions posed in an E-mail to Charles Niemeier, a PCAOB Board 
member, a “behind-the-scenes” look was provided. In response, for example, to the 
question: What do the 2005 inspections reports on the Big Four tell us about the audit 
firms?, Niemeier stated: 
 
. . . they are intended to focus firms on the areas where they can improve. 
. . . I feel comfortable saying the firms have come a long way in identifying 
and addressing risks to their audit quality, as a part of our inspections as 
well as on their own. (Johnson, O&A: The PCAOB’s Charles Niemeier) 
 
A Google search (early January 2009) revealed no empirically driven assessment of the 
effectiveness of the inspection process.   There is support for the efforts of the PCAOB.  
There is generally a realization that oversight is required.  The support for what is 
expected, for example, is highlighted in an award winning paper by Wegman, who noted: 
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While parties coming before the PCAOB can assert their legal rights in the 
enforcement process, they should be mindful that the Board’s “supervisory 
approach” affords them an opportunity to work constructively with the Board.  
The Board much prefers to preserve public accounting firms rather than to see 
them fail.  In almost all cases a firm will be better off taking advantage of the 
Board’s supervisory approach rather than by aggressively contesting the Board’s 
determinations.  After all, both the Board and the profession share the common 
goal of providing the best possible financial information to decision makers.   By 
working constructively with the PCAOB, public accounting firms can best serve 
their clients and themselves and attain the high standards to which their profession 
aspires.  (Wegman) 
 
Wegman’s expectations are appealing.  Now, such expectations need to be transformed 
into hypotheses and empirically investigated.  
 
4.  Methodology and Limitations of the Survey   
 
Triennial firms that received no-deficiency inspection reports were identified by reading 
the inspection reports posted at the PCAOB Website, under the heading “Inspections” as 
of early November..  There were three groups identified:  1.  Firms that had had one 
inspection only and it was reported that there were no deficiencies. 2.  Firms that had had 
two inspections and both were reported to have no deficiencies,  and 3. Firms that had 
had two inspections, with the first one containing deficiencies and the second was 
deficiency free. (There were no firms listed at the time of the sample selected that had a 
no-deficiency first inspection and had deficiencies in its second inspection.)   
 
Sample Selection 
 
From the list of such firms (listing revealed 251 firms with one or two inspections 
without deficiencies as of November 18, 2008), a random sample of 115 firms was 
selected with no attention to whether they had had one or two deficiency free inspections.    
At the time of questionnaire analysis, though, the original sample selected was classified  
into the three groups:  One no-deficiency  inspection:  54 firms; two no deficiency 
inspections:  24; and two inspections, with deficiencies in the first one; no deficiencies in 
the second:  37 firms.    A tally of responses by these three categories did not show 
significant variations, so there were no separate analyses of the three subgroups. 
 
The selection was from triennial firms only inasmuch as none of the 10 firms that audit 
more than 100 issuers annually has to date received a no-deficiency inspection report.  
These 10 firms are inspected yearly.   The success of some of the firms who audited no 
more than 100 issuers yearly justified the focus on this group.  
 
Letter and Survey Questionnaire 
 
The website for each of the firms in the sample was accessed to determine who was the 
head of the firm.  In some instances, the information provided was insufficient, so calls 
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were made to obtain the name of the managing partner or head of the firm.  In only two 
instances were letters directed to Managing Partner, with no name.      
 
The covering letter requested a response to a survey questionnaire of 14 questions as well 
as the title of the person (s) who responded to the survey.  Copies of these two documents 
are in Appendix A.    The respondents were asked to return the questionnaires by 
December 22, 2008.  An envelope was enclosed for the response.  There was no 
identification of responses, so responses were anonymous.  A few identified the name of 
the person who completed the questionnaire, even though the question asked merely for 
the title of the person.  There was no second mailing.  
 
Limitations of Survey Questionnaire 
 
Seeking opinions from busy practitioners through a written survey questionnaire is not 
the optimum strategy for gaining insight into the thoughts of practitioners. While some 
questions allowed for additional comments and a number of respondents did take time to 
write additional notes, there continue to be more interesting questions that arise from 
such additional notes than are answered..   
 
At best, our exploratory survey provides some clues to current thinking and at the same 
time raises some interesting questions for further exploration.   
 
5.  Responses of Triennial Firms 
 
The responses were summarized with no statistical testing to determine significance since 
this was an exploratory study to gain some general insight about a group of registered 
firms that had had at least one no-deficiency inspection report.  After requesting 
information about the date of registration with the PCAOB, the inspections they had 
undergone, how many audits they provided for issuers and for other entities respondents 
were asked about the value of the PCAOB inspection process, the PCAOB overall, their 
plans for expanding their services to issuers, and expectations for new employees.  The 
title of the person (s) responding to the questionnaire was to be identified.   
 
At the time of the sample, there were no triennial firms that had been the subject of  more 
than two inspections.  No firm was identified that had a no-deficiency inspection initially 
and then a deficiency inspection as the second inspection.  (It will be interesting to see 
what happens with the 3rd inspection.)   
 
Basic Information about Respondents 
 
While there were 41 responses (35.6 percent), in some instances not every question was 
answered.  There was no second request sent to the total group. The responses by the 
three categories were as follows: 
                                                                                                              Frequency  %       
      On inspection only  and no deficiencies                                              15        36.6 
      Two inspections, both with no deficiencies                                         12        29.3 
  
                                                                                                                                           14 
                                                                                                                                           
 
       Two inspections, first with deficiencies, second  
                       with no deficiencies                                                             14        34.1 
                                          total                                                                   41      100.0 
 
The original percentages of the three groups included in the sample are somewhat 
different from the percentages of the responses.  (No statistical test was used to determine 
if differences are significant since this is an exploratory survey investigation.) 
The two sets of percentages are: 
                                                                                                                Percentage                                      
                      Inspections                                                                  In sample  In responses 
       One inspection only, with no deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          46.9          36.6     
        Two inspections, both with no deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . ..          20.9          29.3 
        Two inspections, first with deficiencies,  
             second with no deficiencies     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32.2          34.1 
                                                                                                             100.0        100.0 
                                             Total numbers*                                           115            41 
                                                                                                                                        100%         35.6% 
 
*(as noted earlier, in the sample of firms asked to participate, there were 54 one-inspection only firms; 24 
two inspection firms; 37 two inspection firms with first one with deficiencies.) 
 
Date of registration 
 
The respondents indicated when they became registered firms.  Table 1 reports their 
responses.   Most of the firms registered during the first or second year of functioning of 
the PCAOB. 
Table 1 
PCAOB Registration Dates of Respondents 
                                                                    N = 41 
                                  
                                                Year of Registration        Number of  Respondents                              
                               
                                     2003 (first year of the PCAOB)              22    
                                     2004                                                        14       
                                     2005                                                          3 
                                     2006                                                          0 
                                     2007                                                          1 
                                     No response                                              1 
                                                           Total                                  41 
 
Number of Audits:  For Issuers and Others 
 
Respondents were to write in the number  of SEC reporting companies (issuers) for 
which they had performed financial audits during their most recent fiscal year. 
Thirty five of the respondents answered this question.  Results are presented in Table 2. 
The categories are identified as they are in PCAOB reporting.  
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Table 2 
Number of Audits of Issuers and Other Entities 
                                                                  N = 35 
 
         Audits of Issuers                                      Audits of other entities 
 
Five or fewer        21                                                           15 
6 – 25                   11                                                           12 
26-50                      1                                                            3 
51-100                    2                                                            0 
Over 100*               0                                                            5 
     Total                 35                                                          35 
 
*Not applicable to this group of triennial firms since the group is identified as providing 
audits for no more than 100 issuers.    
 
Factors Responsible for No-Deficiencies Inspections 
 
Respondents who had had one or two no-deficiencies inspections were given three factors 
to judge as “critical, not critical or not sure” in achieving no-deficiencies inspections.  
There was an additional item, “Other:  Please describe”.  In Table 3 the responses of the 
two groups – those  who had received a no-deficiencies inspection report for one or two 
inspection engagements – who represented 27 of the 41 respondents. 
 
Table 3 
Respondents’ Opinion of Critical Factors 
in Achieving No-Deficiency Inspection Reports 
                                                                    N = 27                                                                             
                            Critical Factors                                   Critical    Not critical  Not sure 
                             
       Audit partner’s skill in  team leadership                      17               7               3                   
       Level of knowledge/skill of the total audit team          23              0               4 
       Systematic, timely, and thorough review process        26              1               0 
        
A few  comments were added to the open-end 4th item: 
 
      a.  we limit SEC work only to industries in which we have a high level of expertise.  
      b.  we are careful to limit how many issuers we accept. 
      c.   we have been careful about audit documentation. 
 
 
Reasons for Deficiencies and Changes Introduced  
 
There were 14 respondents who had had two inspection reports with deficiencies noted in 
their first inspection reports.  These respondents were asked:  4a:  Which of the following 
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were the reason (s) for a deficiency (or deficiencies) during the first inspection of our 
audits?  (Check reasons)   In Table 4, are the number of responses to each of the factors. 
 
Table 4 
Reasons Identified for Deficiencies by Respondents 
                                                                  N = 14 
 
                                 Audit partner leadership skills inadequate              9 
                                 Weakness in knowledge of  relevant GAAP         10 
                                 Inadequate review process                                     13 
 
Additionally, respondents made the following comments as reasons for deficiencies in 
their first inspection reports:   
             
        a.  Documentation needed to be  enhanced; procedures had been performed in earlier  
             audits,  but had not been completely documented. 
        b.  PCAOB reviewers were very rigid in their review.  They didn’t understand the  
             audit issue and refused to listen to the facts we presented. 
        c.  There was a difference of opinion between the PCAOB inspectors and us that  
             was not resolved appropriately, we believe. 
        d.  PCAOB was unwilling to accept auditor judgment in addressing audit issues that  
            arose. 
        e.  In our opinion, the deficiencies cited by the inspection team were, in fact, not   
            audit deficiencies, but rather differences in opinion of audit workpaper  
            presentation, and their personal opinions about how a particular audit step should  
            be completed and evidenced in the audit workpapers. 
        f.  Partner in charge had an overload; concurring review was not properly completed 
 
Summary.   As noted, the majority of the 14 respondents checked all three of the factors 
as important.  The additional comments reveal perceived inadequacies in the relationship 
between the firm and inspectors, except for the final one (f) which acknowledges an 
overburdened partner. 
 
These 14 respondents were asked the following question:  4b.   What changes did you 
introduce after receiving the first inspection report?   (Check the most important 
changes.)  The final item was:  “Other changes we introduced included”:  (Please discuss 
briefly)   Table 5 indicates the responses to the first four changes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                           17 
                                                                                                                                           
 
Table 5 
Changes Made in Audit Performance 
N = 14 
                        
                  Changes Introduced                                                  Number of Respondents              
       
      We enhanced attention to the audit partner’s role in encouraging 
           careful adherence to auditing standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         6 
      More orientation provided to all audit teams re their clients. . . . .        10 
      Monitored the review process more closely with quick feedback 
                when problems were identified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        12 
       No specific changes were made  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               2 
           
 Additional comments included: 
 
a.  Most important change:  we developed an audit completion checklist to ascertain strict   
     compliance with AS #3.  instituted a substantial monitoring process to assure   
     compliance. 
b.  Added more reliance on PPC standard forms for documentation. 
c.  Because the PCAOB has significant power, we had no alternative other than to make  
     changes to how we audited certain areas based on the opinions of those inspectors. 
 
Summary.  Good faith implementation of changes is reflected in both the responses to 
the structured part of the question and the additional comments, except for c which 
reflects willingness to assume that the firm “had no basis for challenging the judgment of  
the inspection team.” 
 
Value of PCAOB Inspection Process 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate “agree, disagree, or  no opinion” about  statements 
related to value of the PCAOB inspection process.  There was space, also, to add 
comments.  Table  6 presents respondents’ opinions.  Note the extent of agreement with 
items 1, 4, and 5.  Some additional comments, you will note, relate to these topics.  Note 
the extent if disagreement to Item 6.  Also, again, note the comments related to Item 6, 
which, in the end, support the need for inspections. 
 
                                                              Table 6 
Respondents’ Judgments of  Value of PCAPB Inspection Process 
                                                          N = 41                                           
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                            Number of respondents 
                               Statements                                                    Agree     Disagree   No opinion 
                                                                                                     
1.    We found the inspectors knowledgeable, competent, and        
        fair in their inspection (s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      29          9            3        
 2.    We think the inspection process needs to be redesigned for  
        both efficiency and effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     14        16          11        
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 3.   We find the process no more effective than that of the 
        earlier peer review under the Public Oversight Board. .        10        25            6       
 4.   We would prefer an inspection every five years 
        rather than every three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           28           8            5   
 5.   We think the inspection process should require a  
        sufficient sample of our audits to provide an overall  
        measure of our audit quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            31          5            5       
 6.     Inspections aren’t necessary; our commitment to  
         meeting auditing guidance is sufficient      . . . . . . . .           13        24            4           
 
Additional comments related to specific statements included: 
 
Related to Statement 1:      
 
The success of the process lies with the inspection team and their willingness to talk 
about documentation options and reporting issues without becoming “police.” 
 
We found inspectors to be generally knowledgeable and competent, but found the 
inspections, themselves, to be fairer during their second inspection of our firm, almost as 
if they “lightened up” slightly from the first inspection.  
 
The team was there to report on problems but avoided constructive recommendations for 
best practices. 
 
An outside agency should periodically review the staff of the PCAOB for competency. 
 
Related to Statement 4: 
 
Some firms should not be inspected every 3 years, if SEC practice is small.   
 
Related to Statement 6: 
 
In general, I believe the inspection process is a good thing because it keeps our firm 
members on their toes, and we welcome an inspector’s fair analysis. 
 
Regulatory oversight makes process more serious to many in the firm.  (the respondent, 
though encircled “no opinion” for the item.) 
 
Regulatory inspections help put all firms on a level playing field.  Easier to enforce the 
standards internally. 
 
I believe the oversight is important to the profession.  Like it or not, as a profession our 
audit process was faulty previously.   
 
Very important process, albeit painful. 
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Summary:  Both the responses to the structured part of the question and the additional 
comments reflect varying points of view.  There is considerable agreement about the 
overall effectiveness of the inspection process and the superiority of the inspection 
process when compared with the earlier Public Oversight Board peer review strategy.  
However, the opinions related to whether there should be a redesign of the inspection 
process or not resulted in a narrow difference between the number who disagree and the 
number who agree.  A majority agree that there should be a sufficient sample to provide a 
measure of overall audit quality.   A majority in the end did not agree that “inspections 
were unnecessary.”    To what extent is the reality reflected in the final comment added:  
“Very important process, albeit painful.”     Is there a strategy that could be less painful?  
Why should there be anxiety about the process?  Would a more clearly specified process 
with full disclosure of basis for conclusions in an inspection report reduce the “pain?” 
 
Assessment of the PCAOB Overall 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate “agree, disagree, or no opinion” to four statements 
about the PCAOB.  There was an additional item for the respondent to comment on the 
items.   Responses are presented in Table 7.  There are more agreeing with Statements 1, 
3, and 4 than disagreeing.  However, Statement 2 was one with which more respondents 
disagree than agree. 
 
The responses are somewhat puzzling.  While a majority agreed that the inspection 
process “meets the compliance requirement,” the respondents in Statement 4 agreed, 
again a majority, but to a smaller extent, that an inspection should be a compliance audit.   
 
It may not be surprising that the respondents are not agreeing that the PCAOB be the 
audit standard setting since most of the respondents have far more clients who are not 
SEC reporting companies and, thus, are required to adhere to two different sets of audit 
guidance.   The added comments have clues for further consideration and study. 
 
Table 7 
Assessment of Selected Factors Related to the PCAOB 
N = 41 
        
                                                                                        Number of Respondents 
                              Statements                                               Agree   Disagree  No Opinion    
 1.    The PCAOB is an effective oversight board. . . . . . .       24            12            5  
 2.    The PCAOB was wise to become the audit standard  
        setter for those who audit publicly-owned companies 
        and leave auditing guidance for nonpublic companies  
        to the Auditing Standards Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     11            26            4 
 3.   The inspection process we believe meets the Sarbanes- 
       Oxley Act of 2002 requirement that an  inspection is to 
       determine degree of compliance  with relevant rules.  .   32              6             3 
  4.   An inspection should be a compliance audit and  
       conclude with a judgment about firm audit quality 
       overall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    21               16                 4 
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Additional comments included the following: 
 
Related to Statement 1: 
 
 PCAOB inspections should be stricter. 
 There should be better linkage between the planning and field work of the inspectors. 
 
Related to Statement 3: 
 
I think the office based reviews do not allow the PCAOB to assess the expertise and work 
ethic of  the firm.  It is nice to say the workpapers have to stand on their own, but the 
individuals conducting the work do matter.   
 
General comment related to both the process and the PCAOB: 
 
Overall our inspection was positive.  I think we got lucky with our review team, and it 
was done on site.  However, the letter that is issued if you fail, which basically states that 
you did not gather sufficient evidence to issue an opinion, is offensive.  The PCAOB is 
too strict in what they expect.  I feel as if perfection is the only acceptable level of work.  
In summary: 
 
 1.  Agree PCAOB is necessary and better than the earlier peer review process. 
            2.  Think it is a waste of money to inspect small firms with small clients.  
            3.  Think PCAOB needs to change their evaluation procedures and pass/fail  
                 system 
 
Summary.  There are contradictions in responses to the structured part of the question 
inasmuch as the majority indicate that the PCAOB is effective, yet a majority believe that 
the PCAOB should not have become the audit standard setter.  A majority believed that 
the inspection meets the expectations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirements, yet a 
majority at the same time indicate that the inspection should be a compliance audit. 
The additional comments provide clues of  possible areas for improvement. 
 
Plans for Providing More Audits of Issuers 
 
There is discussion from time to time about the extent to which smaller registered firms 
are capable of handling more audits for issuers (companies that report to the SEC) 
The respondents of this survey when asked:  Are you interested in providing auditing 
services to more SEC clients (issuers)   The responses were: 
 
                             Yes                30 
                              No                  8  
                              No response   3 
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Those 30 who responded “yes” were asked to write in how many additional issuers could 
you serve now?  The responses were: 
                      
                        Extent of adding additional clients      Number of respondents 
             
                Five or fewer new clients                       19       
                Six to 25 clients                                        6 
                Twenty six to 50 clients                            2      
                Fifty one to 100 clients                             1 
                No response                                              2 
                                       Total                                 30  
 
It is interesting to note that the majority would consider adding no more than five 
additional clients.  A second question asked:  “Are you considering expanding capacity to 
handle additional clients (issuers)?   Only 14 of the 30 answered “yes” to this question. 
  The others indicated “no” or did not respond.   
 
Reasons for “not interested in serving more SEC clients (issuers)” were requested in an 
open-ended question.  Among the responses from the 8 who stated “No.” were: 
 
 a.  We are currently staffed to handle our three issuers now.  Only will take on  
                  another issuer as a replacement, if needed, for a current issuer  
            b.  We want to maintain high quality by just keeping our current SEC clients. 
                  If we take on more jobs, they must be “clean.”  Most potential clients are not  
                  “clean.” 
            c.   Staffing is a problem. . .  
            d.   Our firm is small; we want to keep it small 
            e.   Our risk tolerance level doesn’t allow for additional audits of issuers 
            f.    Although our firm welcomes a fair inspection of our audit process, I don’t  
       trust individual inspectors to be fair for all inspections.  Negative comments   
       in the report, whether true or not, can have a significant negative effect on   
       our small firm’s practice.  Although we had a comment-free report this past  
       inspection, the comments included in the report from our first inspection  
       actually prevented us from obtaining a new “non-SEC client.  In that  
       particular case, we were proposing to perform consulting services, not even  
       relate d to a certified audit.  As such, I believe larger firms can weather  
       negative comments in their reports much easier than smaller firms.. 
            g.   Our firm s not large enough to have partner rotation; therefore, we must have  
                  no more than 5 SEC clients. 
 
Summary.  The comments reflect a range of attitudes, from awareness that the firm 
wishes to maintain high quality to reluctance to take on risk or meet requirements if client 
list is larger, to awareness of the problems of obtaining quality staff, to uncertainty about 
the repercussions of negative comments in inspections.   
 
Basis for Accepting Issuers 
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Respondents were asked:   As you consider audit engagements for SEC clients (issuers), 
do you have some limit on size of client you accept  as measured by revenues?       
       
Twelve of the 41 respondents checked “yes” and indicated a range of revenue cut off 
points: 
                     Revenue Cut-off    Number of respondents 
                       $20 M                          2 
                         50 M                          3 
                       100 M                          4  
                       500 M                          2 
                            2B                           1 
                                   Total              12 
 
As noted only three registered small firms indicated a cut-off of $500 Million or more. 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate factors used as a basis for accepting a new SEC 
client (issuer)..  There was a range of comments about the factor (s) identified in this 
open-end question:    
                                             
                                          Factors Identified            No. of  Respondents                           
                               
                              Audit risk of potential client                        6             
                              Accounting complexity                                4                         
                              Determine factors in case by case                4 
                              Nature of company; our expertise                4 
                              Only accept 11-K audits of pension plans    4 
                              Professional judgment                                  3 
                              No answer                                                     4 
   
Summary.  The limitation of a questionnaire is highlighted when responses from open-
end questions are reviewed.  In no instance were there explanations of brief comments.  It 
would be informative to know, for example, what was the nature of accounting 
complexity that resulted in declining to accept an audit engagement for an issuer.  What 
were the factors, as another example, that were components of the professional judgment 
made in assessing a potential client? 
 
 
Industries Considered in Accepting Audits for Issuers 
 
There were 27 (65.9 percent)  respondents who answered “yes” when asked if there were 
major industries for which they are willing to consider audit engagement.   Therefore, 14 
respondents (34.1 percent) did not identify specific industries as a basis for considering 
an audit engagement.   The industries identified were:                                    
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                                                    Industries                    Number of Respondents                                       
                                                                                            
                              Financial Institutions/banking                         5 
                              Manufacturing and Service                             5 
                              Pension/retirement plans                                 4                               
                              High tech                                                         3                               
                              Mutual Funds                                                  3 
                              Energy, manufacturing, construction              2 
                              Oil and Gas                                                     2 
                              Any industries but not insurance, not banks   3 
                                                    Total                                        27 
 
Other Audit Services Provided  
 
Except for one response, all others who answered the question:   What audit services, 
beyond financial audits, do you provide that are under PCAOB oversight?  wrote  “none” 
The one exceptional was:  “none other than two SOX 404 audits.” 
 
Expectations for New Employees 
 
The respondents were given an open-end question:  “As you consider your needs in the 
years ahead, what do you list as the most critical competencies you seek in new recruits? 
 
The responses were as follows: 
                                             
                                     Critical Competencies              Number of Respondents      
                                             
                         1.  Interest in continuing to learn                           21      
                              “ability to learn and comprehend quickly” 
                              “willingness to learn and ask questions? 
                              “ability to ask questions about what they                                                                              
                                told” 
                              “desire for life long learning” 
                         2.  Written and oral communication skills             19 
                            “ability to talk with client in 
                             appropriate manner” 
                             “excellent communication skills (written 
                              and oral) 
                            “excellent reading and comprehension  
                               skills” 
                         3.  Good work ethic                                                 15 
                              “willingness to work overtime”   
                              “less focus on personal, feel good  
                               attitude” 
                              “less selfish” 
                              “common sense; business sense” 
                              “willingness to work hard” 
  
                                                                                                                                           24 
                                                                                                                                           
 
                             “desire for profession, not job” 
                         4.  Technical knowledge                                         15 
                              “industry knowledge” 
                              “strong GAAP knowledge” 
                              “both SEC accounting and IFRs” 
                             “technical and computer proficiency” 
                         5.   Analytical skills and critical thinking                  9 
                         6.   Integrity, character, ethical                                  9                
 
Summary:  This question was answered with phrases as are quoted above.  Limited 
answers reflect that the question was open end and asked for  critical competencies.   If 
competencies had been listed, there is high probability that the listing would be somewhat 
different from the one presented here. 
 
Titles  of Respondents  
 
The final question was also an open-end question that asked:  “ What is the title of the 
person (s) who responded to this survey?”  In all instances, there was a single title noted. 
 
The responses were as follows:     
                            
                                     Titles                                          Number of respondents 
 
                Partner, Senior partner, Managing partner                   23 
                Shareholder/stockholder                                                 7 
                Director of Accounting and Auditing                             4                           
                Head of Department                                                        3 
                Manager                                                                           2 
                No response                                                                     2 
                                             Total                                                  41  
 
6.   Review of  Literature    
 
There has been limited attention to empirical studies of triennial firms of the PCAOB.  In 
fact, the inspection process has not been broadly studied.  However, to illustrate the range 
of attention to the topic of triennial firms, two sources were accessed:  These were 
Google (Triennial firms in the PCAOB) and ABI-Inform.  (Small public accounting firms 
in the U. S.)  A limited number of references are here discussed: 
 
Inspections Do Not Measure Audit Quality 
 
A few studies that have been reported make assumptions about what inspection reports 
actually present.  In a study by Daugherty, et al, for example,  a reference to several other 
studies, begins with the comment:  Consistent with the view that PCAOB inspection 
reports are a powerful signal of audit quality. . . . .and the sentence continues to identify 
two studies that built study designs on that assumption.   Yet, in every inspection report 
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there is a disclaimer that an inspection report is not a basis for determining audit quality 
of the firm inspected.  (as discussed earlier; see pages 4 and 5) 
 
Daugherty and his research colleagues, though,  undertook a study questioning whether 
negative outcomes of the PCAOB’s inspection program were associated with triennially 
inspected auditing firms no longer being registered with the PCAOB or losing their 
publicly-traded clients, either voluntarily or involuntarily.    These authors concluded: 
 
:These results suggest that negative  inspection outcomes may lead to the smallest 
of the triennially inspected firms being involuntarily pushed out of public 
company auditing arena.  This finding could be viewed as a favorable 
consequence of the new audit quality oversight mechanism implemented by the 
PCAOB inspection process if the smallest of triennially inspected firms indeed 
have the poorest audit quality relative to their larger competitors inspected 
triennially.   (Daugherty, 11) 
 
There may be justification of equating audit quality with deficiencies or lack of 
deficiencies, but there should be some discussion of how the perception was assured in 
the presence of the disclaimer about audit quality.  Are those making judgments rejecting 
the disclaimer stated in inspection reports or do such individuals know the disclaimer but 
believe that what is presented as deficiencies provides evidence related to audit quality in 
the firm?   Further study of how readers of inspection reports interpret of what is 
provided in an inspection report would be of value.   
 
First and Second Inspections of Triennial Firms   
 
Hermanson, et.al  examined 316 PCAOB inspection reports issued to smaller (triennial) 
firms through July 2006.   They found that 60 percent had audit deficiencies.  They found 
that firms who had deficiencies were smaller, had a larger number of clients and were 
growing more rapidly than those firms that received no-deficiency inspection reports.   
There was no reference to the fact that such inspections do not follow a standardized 
strategy, so the evaluation of inspections among those inspected has serious limitations. 
(Hermanson, et. al.   PCAOB Inspections of Smaller CPA Firms. . . . ) 
 
A followup study of 116 second inspection reports of small firms (as of October 23, 
2008) was conducted by Hermanson and Houston to determine whether smaller audit 
firms have “made improvements in their processes as a result of the PCAOB inspection 
process.”    
 
There results showed that the results “were much more favorable” the second time a 
small firm was inspected.   This result “appears to be attributable to smaller audit firms 
learning from their first inspections and improving their audit procedures, rather than a 
softening of the PCAOB posture.”  (Hermanson,  Evidence from the PCAOB. . . )   This 
statement is supported by the results of our exploratory survey.  (see page 16) 
 
Improved Grade for Timeliness 
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A study of the time lapse between an inspection and the date an inspection report is 
issued was completed by Roybark.  .  Articles in the business press had noted the lack of 
timeliness in reporting in a number of instances.  In the report of the study, Roybark 
presented a table showing the mean number of days from last date in field to report date.  
She presented disaggregated data for:   1. all triennial firm; 2.  those with audit 
deficiencies; and 3.  those with no audit deficiencies.     In all instances the time lapse has 
decreased markedly.  (for all firms, from 398 days in 2004 to 156 in 2007; for those with 
deficiencies, from 416 to 221; for those without deficiencies, 272 to 150.   There was 
improvement for all sizes of  inspected firms between the beginning and ending dates, 
though there were some increases in years between 2004 and 2007.  (Roybark, 66) 
 
The PCAOB and the Smaller Firms 
 
In the PCAOB’s Strategic Plan for 2008 – 2013, there is a discussion of challenges 
including one refers to smaller firms: 
 
Firms of different sizes present different challenges to the PCAOB ad risks to the 
investing public.  While difficult to generalize, smaller firms do not have 
sufficient resources to invest in the technical skills and quality controls necessary 
to be able to audit large or multi-national clients.  In addition, resource constrains, 
as well as lack of opportunity and experience, have prevented smaller firms from 
diversifying their practices the way larger firms have been able to do.  At the 
same time, a smaller firm may be able to devote relatively more senior-;level 
attention to a client than a large firm.  Moreover, a smaller firm, which focuses on 
one industry and has developed an expertise in audits of that industry, may, in 
fact, provide higher quality audits in that particular area than a larger firm with no 
particular expertise in that area.  The PCAOB’s strength in addressing the  
 
challenges associated with both these small firms as well as larger firms is its 
ability to tailor its programs to address differences in the size and nature of firms. 
                                                                                                   (PCAOB, Strategic Plan. . ) 
 
The foregoing appears to be a collection of opinions – potential hypotheses.  There are no 
references to systematic investigation of how  behavior of auditors in smaller firms differ 
from those in mid-size and large firms.   The PCAOB has valuable data for empirical 
studies of triennial firms.   
 
An initiative provided by the PCAOB, The Forum on Auditing in the Small Business 
Environment, is for registered smaller accounting and public companies.  The Forum, for 
example, has planned six one day meetings in 2009 in six locations across the United 
States. Agenda items deal with current issues and trends that impact audits to the 
inspection process and new auditing standards.  
 
The General Accountability Office Study of Public Accounting Firms 
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A comprehensive report related to concentration in audits of public companies revealed 
some shifts in changes in which public accounting firms are participating in auditing 
publicly-owned companies.   
 
From January 2003 to June 2007, the largest firms had a net loss of 1,149 clients; while 
midsize firms had a net increase of 282 clients, and smaller firms had a net increase of 
867,     Noted in the report was the following:   
 
. . . despite the largest firms experiencing a net loss of over one thousand clients, 
most of these were smaller companies with lower revenues and audit fees.  . 
Companies that changed from one of the largest firms to another had average 
revenues of over $1 billion, while companies that changed from one of the largest 
firms to a smaller firm had average revenues of just over $60 million.  (GAO, 83) 
 
In a discussion of disincentives and challenges to entering the large public company audit 
market,  the response of 75 percent of smaller firms surveyed said they were not 
interested in serving as auditor for additional large public companies.    
 
In the survey reported in this paper,  a comparable question was not asked.  However, 
thirty of the 41 who participated in the survey indicated an interest in serving more 
issuers.  A specific question about the audit of large public companies was not asked, 
although a question about revenue cut off was asked; only 12 responded, with 7 
indicating revenue cutoffs of $100M  or $500 M or $2 B.  (See page 22)   
 
The Report revealed that the largest accounting firms audit 98 percent of the more than 
1,500 largest public companies; these have annual revenues of more than $1B.  At the 
same time, smaller firms audit 69 percent of the more than 3,600 smallest companies; 
these have revenues of less than $100M.    (Note:  Triennial firms are those who audit 
100 or fewer SEC clients; revenues is not basis for cutoff) 
 
While 82 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies saw their choice of auditor as limited to 
three or fewer firms and about 60 percent viewed competition in their audit market as 
insufficient, most small public companies reported being satisfied with the auditor 
choices available to them.  (GAO, 2)  The shift between 2002 and 2006 for auditing 
public companies with revenues of $100M - %500M indicates the following: 
 
           Segment  of  Accounting Firms                2002                    2006 
 
                        Largest firms                                90%                      71% 
                        Midsize firms                                 6%                      16% 
                        Smaller firms                                 5%                       13% 
 
However, for publicly-owned companies with revenues greater than $1B, the largest 
firms continued to be the auditors (98 percent in both 2002 and 2006) and for larger 
public companies with revenues greater than $500M (95% revenues in 2002 and 92% in 
2006)     .    
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The GAO team responsible for the investigation considered proposals by academics and 
business groups to reduce risks of current and further audit market concentration.  In the 
end, they concluded that the evidence was limited “that the currently concentrated market  
has created significant adverse impact” and thus, they concluded “we found no 
compelling need to take action.”  The GAO does not reveal the basis of their judgment.  
Possibly, the shift in who is providing audits for the smaller publicly-owned companies, 
as noted in the figures above, was one factor in concluding that no action needed to be 
recommended at this point. 
 
The role of the midsize and smaller firms in the future will be worthy of study in 
innovative, objective ways.   There are undoubtedly opportunities for expansion.  
 
Summary:   Possibly,  the most critical factors about the inspection process (described as 
the core oversight responsibility of the PCAOB) have yet to be empirically studied.  The 
limited references identified in the search for related literature did not reveal concern 
with basic issues.  For example, a supervisory approach to oversight with a standard 
strategy for determining compliance needs to be rigorously studied.  Inasmuch, as noted 
in inspection reports, inspectors make judgments about what areas of audits will be 
reviewed in an inspection engagement, there is no disclosure that a random sample is 
taken, there is no assurance of consistency among inspections for a single year or year 
after year.  It must be underscored that the inspection reports clearly indicate the 
limitations in interpreting what is presented. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 states that the inspection is for the purpose of 
determining compliance.    Standard, consistent,  assessment measures are typically 
present in determining compliance.      The process for PCAOB inspections, as described 
in the first annual report issued by the PCAOB, noted that a supervisory approach was the 
strategy for an inspection.    Such a strategy appears more relevant for a consulting 
engagement than a compliance engagement. 
 
Ultimately, an oversight process for audits should result in a determination of  audit 
quality.  To date there is no basis for making any judgment about “progress” in enhancing 
audit quality in the performance of audits of publicly-owned companies.  To continue to 
rely, for example, on the number of deficiencies reported from an engagement as a 
measure of effectiveness about a firm’s performance of audits does not seem warranted..   
 
To date, there has been no disclosure of the PCAOB’s concern about the adequacy of its 
strategy for inspection engagements.  Possibly, the Research and Analysis Office is 
undertaking such an investigation. 
 
7.  Summary and Reflections on Responses 
 
As noted initially this was an exploratory survey to gain an initial view of audit 
performance of a sample from the group of registered firms who had received one or two 
inspection reports that had no deficiencies.  They are a minority of the total population of 
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registered firms who have been inspected since full inspections began in 2004.  At the 
time the sample was drawn there were no triennial firms that had had more than two 
inspections.   
 
The largest four firms had limited inspections in 2003 and inspections yearly since that 
year.   The next 6 largest firms have had annual inspections since 2004.  To date none of 
these annually inspected firms has received a no-deficiency inspection report. 
 
Summary 
 
Executives of  41 (35.6 percent) triennial firms of the 115 to whom requests were mailed 
responded to the questionnaire.  Respondents from each of the three subgroups were:  15 
with one inspection, which revealed no deficiencies; 12 with two inspections with no 
deficiencies; and 14 with two inspections, with the first disclosing deficiencies and the 
second without deficiencies.   
 
1.  Factors perceived critical for achieving no-deficiency audits accepted by the 
respondents were:  1.  Systematic, timely and thorough review process; 2.  Level of 
knowledge/skill of the total audit team and; 3.  audit partner’s skill in team leadership.             
 
2.  A majority of respondents concurred the reasons for deficiencies were 1.  inadequate 
review process, 2.  weaknesses in knowledge of relevant GAAP and 3.  audit partner 
leadership skills inadequate.   
 
3.  Those with deficiencies in their first inspections implemented changes which resulted 
in no-deficiency second inspections.   
 
4.  While there was agreement among the respondents that an inspection process is 
necessary and most agreed that the PCAOB was effective, there was disagreement, to 
some extent, about the need for an inspection of triennial firms every three years and 
about the PCAOB choosing to be audit standard setter for registered firms auditing SEC 
clients (issuers).   
 
5.  Far more of the respondents are interested in serving more issuers than they are 
currently serving a limited additional number of SEC clients , there were eight who said 
that they are not interested in expanding their services to issuers.   
 
6.  Critical competencies highlight the importance of meeting changing demands with the 
most commonly identified critical competency (21 respondents of 41) noted that new 
recruits must be interested in continuing to learn. 
 
Reflections on Opinions Expressed by  Triennial Firms’ Respondents 
 
There is an acceptance of the need for an oversight function for public accountants who 
audit SEC clients.    However, among the responses and additional comments are clues 
that indicate that the inspection process is not as effective as it should be.    
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Questions yet to be answered: 
 
1.  Is the supervisory approach sufficient to enhance audit quality?        
 
2.  How much disclosure should there be when there are differences between the firm 
under inspection and the PCAOB inspection team? 
 
3.   While a majority noted that the PCAOB is an effective oversight board, a majority at  
       the same time did not believe that the PCAOB should have become the audit  
       standard setter.   Why did they not think the PCAOB should be the audit standard  
       setter?  Did they believe here was a conflict of interest?  Did they question the  
       independence of the standard setting responsibility in the presence of making  
       judgments about the implementation of auditing standards by the registered firms?  
       There has been heightened attention to the importance of good internal controls, yet 
       a newly established oversight board assumed standard setting responsibilities (these 
      were not mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, but could be assumed by the 
      PCAOB).  There has been no discussion of this clearly questionable overlap of  
      responsibilities if assurance of good faith review of auditing standards was to be  
      achieved. 
 
4.    Is there a need for a compliance style audit that concludes with an assessment of a  
       firm’s performance of audits?   Possibly, the most puzzling opinions were related to  
       the responses to two statements in Question 7 that the inspection process meets the  
       expectations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requirement, a majority also agreed  
       that the inspection should be a compliance audit. 
  .  
 
As noted in the summary of the preceding section of this paper, much more detailed study 
is needed to resolve the contradictory opinions and to determine the effective of the 
current inspection process.   The PCAOB’s inspection process needs an objective, 
comprehensive assessment.    
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Appendix A 
 
 
(Copy of the letter sent to the 115 firms) 
 
 
Name 
Address 
 
 
 
Your opinion about the PCAOB inspection process and related topics are of interest to us.  
Your firm is unique:  it is among the minority of registered firms that have achieved 
deficiency-free inspection reports.  We believe your experience in achieving quality 
audits would be of value to many interested in enhancing audit quality in our society. .    
 
We have selected a random sample of 115 firms from the listings of inspection reports 
posted at the PCAOB website. (as of early November).  These selected firms have had at 
least one deficiency-free audit; some selected have had two deficiency-free audits; some 
had an initial audit with deficiencies but a second one without deficiencies.   
 
The enclosed survey is to be answered anonymously. There is to be no identification of  
your firm.   In addition to questions about the inspection process, there are questions 
related to some of the PCAOB responsibilities.  Any additional comments about other 
aspects of the PCAOB’s  responsibilities are welcome.   
 
If possible, we hope you will participate in this survey investigation  and forward your 
responses in the enclosed envelope by December  22..   If you have any questions, send 
an email or call one of us.   
 
We thank you for considering our request.  We applaud your fine performance as auditors 
and we extend our best wishes to you and your firm for continuing success in this 
challenging economic environment. 
 
Sincerely 
 
 
 
Enclosures:  Survey form; return self-addressed envelope 
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(Copy of the survey questionnaire that was sent to 115 firms) 
 
Your Opinion:  PCAOB Inspection Process and Related Matters 
 
As noted in the covering letter, your firm has received one or two deficiency-free 
inspection reports.  Your responses are valuable in our gaining insight as efforts to 
enhance audit quality are underway.  Please know that your responses are totally 
anonymous; candid responses are deeply appreciated.   
 
1.  In what year did you become a registered firm with the PCAOB?_________. 
2.  Your firm has been inspected (please check) 
      2.1  ________once only; with no deficiencies 
      2.2 ________twice, both with no deficiencies 
      2.3  _______ twice, first with deficiencies; second, without deficiencies 
 
If you checked 2.1 or 2.2, please respond to Question 3; if you checked 2.3, 
please respond to Question 4.   
 
3.  (for No- deficiencies firms)What factors directly related to the audit performance do   
     you believe were critical in assuring no deficiencies identified by inspectors.  Indicate  
     whether or not critical for each factor:.                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                    (encircle one opinion) 
     3.1  audit partner’s skill in  team leadership                 Critical    Not critical    Not sure  
     3.2  level of knowledge/skill of the total audit team     Critical    Not critical   Not sure 
     3.3  systematic, timely, and thorough review process   Critical    Not critical   Not sure 
     3.4  Other (please identify factors that are also critical) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  (for  firms with deficiencies during first PCAOB inspection) 
 
    4a:  Which of the following were the reason (s) for a deficiency (or deficiencies) 
            during the first inspection of our audits?  (Check reasons) 
                   
             _____ audit partner leadership skills inadequate      
             _____  weakness in knowledge of  relevant GAAP 
             _____  inadequate review process 
             ______Other:  please describe: ________________________________: 
             _________________________________________________________             
 
  4b.   What changes did you introduce after receiving the first inspection report?  
           (Check the most important changes. 
      
          ______   We enhanced attention to the audit partner’s role in encouraging 
                         careful adherence to auditing standards 
           _____    More orientation provided to all audit teams re their clients 
           _____    Monitored the review process more closely with quick feedback 
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                         when problems were identified  
            ______ No specific changes were made 
            ______ Other changes we introduced included:  (Please discuss briefly)  
     _____________________________________________________________ 
     _____________________________________________________________ 
     _____________________________________________________________ 
 
   5.  How many financial audits did your firm perform during your most recent fiscal     
        Year?   Indicate number for SEC reporting companies (Issuers)__________ 
                     Indicate number for privately held companies__________________ 
 
Value of  PCAOB Inspection Process 
 
6.    Indicate whether you agree, disagree, or have no opinion with each of the following 
statements:                                                                                                               
                                                                                                           (Encircle response)                                             
6.1  We found the inspectors knowledgeable, competent, and        
        fair in their inspection (s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        agree   disagree  no opinion         
6.2  We think the inspection process needs to be redesigned for  
        both efficiency and effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       agree    disagree  no opinion     
6.3   We find the process no more effective than that of the 
         earlier peer review under the Public Oversight Board. .         agree    disagree  no opinion       
6.4    We would prefer an inspection every five years 
          rather than every three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           agree   disagree   no opinion   
6.5    We think the inspection process should require a  
          sufficient sample of our audits to provide an overall  
           measure of our audit quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           agree    disagree   no opinion        
6.6     Inspections aren’t necessary; our commitment to  
          meeting auditing guidance is sufficient      . . . . . . . .             agree   disagree   no opinion 
6.7     (Other)  Please discuss briefly any other comments about the inspection   
           process:________________________________________________________ 
           _______________________________________________________________ 
           _______________________________________________________________        
 Note:  Further comment re any of the above you encircled “disagree” is welcome. 
          (attach a sheet to this form) 
 
The PCAOB OVERALL  
 
7..  Indicate whether you agree, disagree, or have no opinion with each of the following 
statements:    
                                                                                                               (Encircle response)    
7.1  The PCAOB is an effective oversight board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  agree  disagree  no opinion  
7.2  The PCAOB was wise to become the audit standard setter 
        for those who audit publicly-owned companies and leave 
        auditing guidance for nonpublic companies to the Auditing 
        Standards Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agree disagree  no opinion 
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7.3   The inspection process we believe meets the Sarbanes-Oxley  
        Act of 2002 requirement that an  inspection is to determine 
        degree of compliance  with relevant rules.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  agree  disagree   no opinion 
7.4   An inspection should be a compliance audit and conclude with a  
        judgment about firm audit quality overall            . . . . . . . . . agree   disagree     no opinion 
7.5   (Other)  Please discuss briefly comments related to any aspect  of the PCAOB_____        
        ___________________________________________________________________ 
        ___________________________________________________________________ 
         __________________________________________________________________                      
 
Note:  further comment re any of the above you encircled “disagree” is welcome. 
          (attach a sheet to this form) 
 
Your Plans for Providing More Audits of Issuers 
 
8.     Are you interested in provided auditing services to more SEC client (issuers)?     
        __________Yes                       ___________No 
 
9.      a.  If you checked “Yes” how many additional issuers could you serve now?  
              ____________ 
         b.  Are you considering expanding capacity to handle additional issuers?     
              ___________________________________________________________ 
 
10.   If you checked “No” in response to 8, why are you not interested in serving more   
        SEC clients (issuers)? _____________________________________________   
        _________________________________________________________  
        ___________________________________________________________________ 
11.    As you consider audit engagements for SEC clients (issuers), do you have some  
         limit on size of client you accept  as measured by revenues?       
         ______Yes, we have a cut off at  $_______________    
         _____No, we use (indicate factor) _______________as a basis for determining  
                   acceptance of an issuer.   
  
12.    As you consider audit engagements for issuers, do you choose firms from certain  
         industries?   
          ______Yes, primarily from  (identify major industries for which you 
         are willing to consider engagements)____________________________________ 
         __________________________________________________________________ 
 
          _____No, we do not consider the industry in making our decision about acceptance  
          of an issuer who seeks an auditor. 
  
13.   What audit services, beyond financial audits, do you provide that are under PCAOB      
        oversight?__________________________________________________________   
         __________________________________________________________________ 
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Expectations for New Employees 
 
14.  As you consider your needs in the years ahead, what do you list as the most critical 
competencies  you seek in new recruits?_______________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
What is the title of the person (s) who responded to this survey?  
_________________________________________________________ 
 
As noted earlier,  additional comments are welcome; attach pages for such 
comments.  We thank you for your response.   
 
  Return by December 22 in enclosed envelope to:       
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
